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Abstract
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders,
each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies
between the assets are captured by an attack graph, where an edge from one asset to another
indicates that if the former asset is compromised, an attack can be launched on the latter asset.
Each edge has an associated probability of successful attack, which can be reduced via security
investments by the defenders. In such scenarios, we investigate the security investments that
arise under certain features of human decision-making that have been identified in behavioral
economics. In particular, humans have been shown to perceive probabilities in a nonlinear
manner, typically overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high probabilities. We
show that suboptimal investments can arise under such weighting in certain network topologies.
We also show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in settings with multiple (behavioral)
defenders, and study the inefficiency of the equilibrium investments by behavioral defenders
compared to a centralized socially optimal solution.
1 Introduction
Modern cyber-physical systems (CPS) are increasingly facing attacks by sophisticated adversaries.
These attackers are able to identify the susceptibility of different targets in the system and strategi-
cally allocate their efforts to compromise the security of the network. In response to such intelligent
adversaries, the operators (or defenders) of these systems also need to allocate their often limited
security budget across many assets to best mitigate their vulnerabilities. This has led to significant
research in understanding how to better secure these systems, with game-theoretical models receiv-
ing increasing attention due to their ability to systematically capture the interactions of strategic
attackers and defenders [1–8].
In the context of large-scale interdependent systems, adversaries often use stepping-stone attacks
to exploit vulnerabilities within the network in order to compromise a particular target [9]. Such
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threats can be captured via the notion of attack graphs that represent all possible paths that
attackers may have to reach their targets within the CPS [10]. The defenders in such systems are
each responsible for defending some subset of the assets [2, 11] with their limited resources. These
settings have been explored under various assumptions on the defenders and attackers [11–13].
In much of the existing literature, the defenders and attackers are modeled as fully rational
decision-makers who choose their actions to maximize their expected utilities. However, a large
body of work in behavioral economics has shown that humans consistently deviate from such
classical models of decision-making [14–16]. A seminal model capturing such deviations is prospect
theory (introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in [14]), which shows that humans perceive gains,
losses, and probabilities in a skewed (nonlinear) manner, typically overweighting low probabilities
and underweighting high probabilities. Recent papers have studied the implications of prospect
theoretic preferences in the context of CPS security and robustness [17–19], energy consumption
decisions in the smart grid [20], pricing in communication networks [21], and network interdiction
games [22].
In this paper, we consider the scenario where each (human) defender misperceives the probabil-
ities of successful attack in the attack graph.1 We characterize the impacts of such misperceptions
on the security investments made by each defender. In contrast with prior work on prospect the-
oretic preferences in the context of CPS security, [17] which assumed that each defender is only
responsible for the security of a single node, we consider a more general case where each defender
is responsible for a subnetwork (i.e., set of assets). Furthermore, each defender can also invest in
protecting the assets of other defenders, which may be beneficial in interdependent CPS where the
attacker exploits paths through the network to reach certain target nodes.
Specifically, we build upon the recent work [13] where the authors studied a game-theoretic
formulation involving attack graph models of interdependent systems and multiple defenders. The
authors showed how to compute the optimal defense strategies for each defender using a convex
optimization problem. However, they did not investigate the characteristics of optimal investments
and the impacts of behavioral biases of the defenders which are the focus of the present work.
We introduce the attack-graph based security game framework in Section 2, followed by the
behavioral security game setting in Section 3. Under appropriate assumptions on the probabilities
of successful attack on each edge, we establish the convexity of the perceived expected cost of each
defender and prove the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) in this class of games.
We primarily investigate the security investments when users with such behavioral biases act
in isolation (Section 4) as well as in a game-theoretic setting (Section 5). As a result, we find
certain characteristics of the security investments under behavioral decision making that could not
have been predicted under classical notions of decision-making (i.e., expected cost minimization)
considered in prior work [13]. In particular, we show that nonlinear probability weighting can
cause defenders to invest in a manner that increases the vulnerability of their assets to attack.
Furthermore, we illustrate the impacts of having a mix of defenders (with heterogeneous levels of
probability weighting bias) in the system, and show that the presence of defenders with skewed
perceptions of probability can in fact benefit the non-behavioral defenders in the system.
We then propose a new metric, Price of Behavioral Anarchy (PoBA), to capture the inefficiency
of the equilibrium investments made by behavioral decision-makers compared to a centralized (non-
behavioral) socially optimal solution, and provide tight bounds for the PoBA. We illustrate the
1 While existing literature on behavioral aspects of information security, such as [23–25] rely on human subject
experiments and more abstract decision-making models, we consider the more concrete framework of attack graphs
in our analysis. This framework allows for a mapping from existing vulnerabilities to potential attack scenarios.
Specifically, one model that is captured by our formulation is to define vulnerabilities by CVE-IDs [26], and assign
attack probabilities using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [27].
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applicability of the proposed framework in a case study involving a distributed energy resource
failure scenario, DER.1, identified by the US National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
Resource (NESCOR) [28] in Section 6.
This paper extends the conference version of this work [29] in the following manner:
• We rigorously prove the uniqueness of optimal investment decisions for behavioral defenders,
and show that Behavioral Security Games can have multiple PNEs in general.
•We quantify the inefficiency of the Nash equilibria by defining the notion of PoBA, and provide
(tight) bounds on it.
• We illustrate the theoretical findings via a case study.
2 The Security Game Framework
In this section, we describe our general security game framework, including the attack graph and
the characteristics of the attacker and the defenders. An overview of our model is shown in Figure 1.
2.1 Attack Graph
We represent the assets in a CPS as nodes of a directed graph G = (V, E) where each node vi ∈ V
represents an asset. A directed edge (vi, vj) ∈ E means that if vi is successfully attacked, it can be
used to launch an attack on vj .
The graph contains a designated source node vs (as shown in Figure 1), which is used by an
attacker to begin her attack on the network. Note that vs is not a part of the network under
defense; rather it is an entry point that is used by an attacker to begin her attack on the network.2
For a general asset vt ∈ V , we define Pt to be the set of directed paths from the source vs to
vt on the graph, where a path P ∈ Pt is a collection of edges {(vs, v1), (v1, v2), ..., (vk , vt)}. For
instance, in Figure 1, there are two attack paths from vs to vt.
Each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E has an associated weight p0i,j ∈ (0, 1], which denotes the probability of
successful attack on asset vj starting from vi in the absence of any security investments.
3
We now describe the defender and adversary models in the following two subsections.
2.2 Strategic Defenders
Let D be the set of all defenders of the network. Each defender Dk ∈ D is responsible for defending
a set Vk ⊆ V \{vs} of assets. For each compromised asset vm ∈ Vk, defenderDk will incur a financial
loss Lm ∈ [0,∞). For instance, in the example shown in Figure 1, there are three defenders with
assets shown in different shades, and the loss values of specific nodes are indicated.
To reduce the attack success probabilities on edges interconnecting assets inside the network,
a defender can allocate security resources on these edges.4 We assume that each defender Dk has
a security budget Bk ∈ [0,∞). Let xki,j denote the security investment of defender Dk on the edge
(vi, vj). We define
Xk := {xk ∈ R|E|≥0|1Txk ≤ Bk}; (1)
2If there are multiple nodes where the attacker can begin her attack, then we can add a virtual node vs, and add
edges from this virtual node to these other nodes with attack success probability 1 without affecting our formulation.
3 In practice, CVSS [27] can be used for estimating initial probabilities of attack (for each edge in our setting).
For example, [10] takes the Access Complexity (AC) sub-metric in CVSS (which takes values in {low, medium, high},
representing the complexity of exploiting the vulnerability) and maps it to a probability of exploit (attack) success.
The more complex it is to exploit a vulnerability, the less likely an attacker will succeed. Similarly, [30] provides
methods and tables to estimate the probability of successful attack from CVSS metrics.
4Note that vs does not have any incoming edges, and hence, it can not be defended.
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Figure 1: Overview of the interdependent security game framework. This CPS consists of three
interdependent defenders. An attacker tries to compromise critical assets starting from vs.
thus Xk is the set of feasible investments for defender Dk and it consists of all possible non-negative
investments on the edges of the graph such that the sum of these investments is upper bounded by
Bk. We denote any particular vector of investments by defender Dk as xk ∈ Xk. Each entry of xk
denotes the investment on an edge.
Let x =
[
x1, x2, . . . , x|D|
]
be a joint defense strategy of all defenders, with xk ∈ Xk for defender
Dk; thus, x ∈ R|D||E|≥0 . Under a joint defense strategy x, the total investment on edge (vi, vj) is
xi,j ,
∑
Dk∈D
xki,j. Let pi,j : R≥0 → [0, 1] be a function mapping the total investment xi,j to an
attack success probability, with pi,j(0) = p
0
i,j. In particular, pi,j(xi,j) is the conditional probability
that an attack launched from vi to vj succeeds, given that vi has been successfully compromised.
2.3 Adversary Model and Defender Cost Function
In networked cyber-physical systems (CPS), there are a variety of adversaries with different capabil-
ities that are simultaneously trying to compromise different assets. We consider an attacker model
that uses stepping-stone attacks [9]. In particular, for each asset in the network, we consider an
attacker that starts at the entry node vs and attempts to compromise a sequence of nodes (moving
along the edges of the network) until it reaches its target asset. If the attack at any intermediate
node is not successful, the attacker is detected and removed from the network. Note that our for-
mulation allows each asset to be targeted by a different attacker, potentially starting from different
points in the network.
In other words, after the defense investments have been made, then for each asset in the network,
the attacker chooses the path with the highest probability of successful attack for that asset (such
a path is shown in red in Figure 1). Such attack models (where the attacker chooses one path to
her target asset) have previously been considered in the literature (e.g., [31, 32]).
To capture this, for a given set of security investments by the defenders, we define the vulner-
ability of a node vm ∈ V as max
P∈Pm
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
pi,j(xi,j), where Pm is the set of all directed paths from
the source vs to asset vm; note that for any given path P ∈ Pm, the probability of the attacker
successfully compromising vm by taking the path P is
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
pi,j(xi,j), where pi,j(xi,j) is the con-
4
ditional probability defined at the end of Section II-B. In other words, the vulnerability of each
asset is defined as the maximum of the attack probabilities among all available paths to that asset.
The goal of each defender Dk is to choose her investment xk ∈ Xk in order to minimize the
expected cost defined as
Cˆk(xk,x−k) =
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
pi,j(xi,j)
)
(2)
subject to xk ∈ Xk, and where x−k is the vector of investments by defenders other than Dk. Thus,
each defender chooses her investments in order to minimize the vulnerability of her assets, i.e., the
highest probability of attack among all available paths to each of her assets.5
In the next section, we review certain classes of probability weighting functions that capture
human misperception of probabilities. Subsequently, we introduce such functions into the above
security game formulation, and study their impact on the investment decisions and equilibria.
3 Nonlinear Probability Weighting and the Behavioral Security
Game
3.1 Nonlinear Probability Weighting
The behavioral economics and psychology literature has shown that humans consistently misper-
ceive probabilities by overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high probabilities [14,33].
More specifically, humans perceive a “true” probability p ∈ [0, 1] as w(p) ∈ [0, 1], where w(·) is a
probability weighting function. A commonly studied probability weighting function was proposed
by Prelec in [33], and is given by
w(p) = exp
[
− (− log(p))α
]
, p ∈ [0, 1], (3)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter that controls the extent of overweighting and underweighting.
When α = 1, we have w(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1], which corresponds to the situation where
probabilities are perceived correctly. Smaller values of α lead to a greater amount of overweighting
and underweighting, as illustrated in Figure 2. Next, we incorporate this probability weighting
function into the security game defined in the last section, and define the Behavioral Security
Game that is the focus of this paper.
3.2 The Behavioral Security Game
Recall that each defender seeks to protect a set of assets, and the probability of each asset being
successfully attacked is determined by the corresponding probabilities on the edges that constitute
the paths from the source node to that asset. This motivates a broad class of games that incorporate
probability weighting, as defined below.
Definition 1. We define a Behavioral Security Game as a game between different defenders in
an interdependent network, where each defender misperceives the attack probability on each edge
according to the probability weighting function defined in (3). Specifically, the perceived attack
probability by a defender Dk on an edge (vi, vj) is given by
wk(pi,j(xi,j)) = exp
[
− (− log(pi,j(xi,j)))αk
]
, (4)
5This also models settings where the specific path taken by the attacker or the attack plan is not known to the
defender apriori, and the defender seeks to make the most vulnerable path to each of her assets as secure as possible.
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Figure 2: Prelec probability weighting function (3) which transforms true probabilities p into
perceived probabilities w(p). The parameter α controls the extent of overweighting and under-
weighting.
where pi,j(xi,j) ∈ [0, 1] and αk ∈ (0, 1].
Remark 1. The subscript k in αk and wk(·) allows each defender in the Behavioral Security Game
to have a different level of misperception. We will drop the subscript k when it is clear from the
context. 
Incorporating this into the cost function (2), each defender Dk seeks to minimize her perceived
expected cost
Ck(xk,x−k)=
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm

max
P∈Pm
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
wk (pi,j(xi,j))

. (5)
Thus, our formulation complements the existing decision-making models based on vulnerability
and cost by incorporating certain behavioral biases in the cost function.
Remark 2. In addition to misperceptions of probabilities, empirical evidence shows that humans
perceive costs differently from their true values. In particular, humans (i) compare uncertain
outcomes with a reference utility or cost, (ii) exhibit risk aversion in gains and risk seeking behavior
in losses, and (iii) overweight losses compared to gains (loss aversion). A richer behavioral model,
referred to as cumulative prospect theory [10], incorporates all these aspects in its cost function.
However, in the setting of this paper, this richer model does not significantly change the cost
functions of the defenders. Specifically, the attack on an asset is either successful or it is not.
If the reference cost is zero for each asset (i.e., the default state where the asset is not attacked
successfully), then successful attack constitutes a loss, and the index of loss aversion only scales the
constant Lm by a scalar without changing the dependence of the cost function on the investments.

3.3 Assumptions on the Probabilities of Successful Attack
The shape of the probability weighting function (3) presents several challenges for analysis. In
order to maintain analytical tractability, we make the following assumption on the probabilities of
successful attack on each edge.
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Assumption 1. For every edge (vi, vj), the probability of successful attack pi,j(xi,j) is log-convex
6,
strictly decreasing, and twice continuously differentiable for xi,j ∈ [0,∞).
One particular function satisfying the above conditions is
pi,j(xi,j) = p
0
i,j exp(−xi,j). (6)
Such probability functions fall within the class commonly considered in security economics (e.g.,
[35]), and we will specialize our analysis to this class for certain results in the paper. For such
functions, the (true) attack success probability of any given path P from the source to a target vt
is given by ∏
(vm,vn)∈P
pm,n(xm,n) =
( ∏
(vm,vn)∈P
p0m,n
)
exp
(
−
∑
(vm,vn)∈P
xm,n
)
. (7)
Thus, the probability of successful attack on a given path decreases exponentially with the sum of
the investments on all edges on that path by all defenders.
Remark 3. The paper [13] studied this same class of security games for the case of non-behavioral
defenders (i.e., with αk = 1,∀Dk ∈ D). For that case, with probability functions given by (6),
[13] showed that the optimal investments for each defender can be found by solving a convex
optimization problem. Suitable modifications of the same approach to account for the parameter
αk will also work for determining the optimal investments by the behavioral defenders in this paper.
We omit the details in the interest of space. 
4 Properties of the Optimal Investment Decisions By a Single
Defender
We start our analysis of the impact of behavioral decision-making by considering settings with only
a single defender (i.e., |D| = 1). In particular, we will establish certain properties of the defender’s
cost function (5), and subsequently identify properties of the defender’s optimal investment deci-
sions under behavioral (i.e., α < 1) and non-behavioral (i.e., α = 1) decision-making. This setting
will help in understanding the actions (i.e., best responses) of each player in multi-defender Behav-
ioral Security Games, which we will consider in the next section. In this section, we will refer to
the defender as Dk, and drop the vector x−k from the arguments.
4.1 Convexity of the Cost Function
We first prove the convexity of the defender’s cost function. To do so, we start with the following
result.
Lemma 1. For αk ∈ (0, 1) and (vi, vj) ∈ E, let h(xi,j) , (− log(pi,j(xi,j)))αk . Then, h(xi,j) is
strictly concave in xi,j for xi,j ∈ [0,∞) under Assumption 1. Moreover, h(xi,j) is concave in xi,j
for αk ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. For ease of notation, we drop the subscripts i, j, and k in the following analysis. First,
we focus on the case where α ∈ (0, 1). Note from Assumption 1 that 0 < p(x) ≤ 1, and so
0 ≤ − log(p(x)) <∞ for all x ∈ [0,∞).
6This is a common assumption in the literature. In particular, [34] shows that log-convexity of the attack probabil-
ity functions is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal security investment result of the seminal paper [35]
to hold.
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Now, we prove that h(x) is strictly concave:
h′(x) = −α(− log(p(x)))α−1 p
′(x)
p(x)
h′′(x) = α(α− 1)(− log(p(x)))α−2 (p
′(x))2
(p(x))2
+ α(− log(p(x)))α−1
[
(p′(x))2 − p(x)p′′(x)
(p(x))2
]
.
From Assumption 1, p(x) is strictly decreasing and therefore p′(x) < 0. Thus, the first term on
the R.H.S. of h′′(x) is strictly negative if α ∈ (0, 1). Also, since p(x) is twice-differentiable and
log-convex with a convex feasible defense strategy domain R≥0, following [36, Subsection 3.5.2], we
have (p′(x))2 ≤ p(x)p′′(x), which ensures that the second term is non-positive. Therefore, h(x) is
strictly concave.
Finally, if α = 1, we have h(x) = − log(p(x)), and since p(x) is log-convex, h(x) is concave.
Using the above result, we now prove that the defender’s cost function (5) is convex.
Lemma 2. For all αk ∈ (0, 1] and under Assumption 1, the cost function (5) of the defender Dk
is convex in the defense investment xk.
Proof. For each attack path P , define hP (xk) ,
∑
(vi,vj)∈P
(− log(pi,j(xi,j)))αk . Then, using the Prelec
function in (4), the cost in (5) is given by
Ck(xk) =
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
exp(−hP (xk))
)
.
Note that hP (xk) is separable and by Lemma 1, each term in hP (xk) is concave in a different
variable (i.e., each term corresponds to a different edge (vi, vj) in the attack path P ). Thus, hP (xk)
is concave in xk, and so exp(−hP (xk)) is convex in xk. Moreover, the maximum of a set of convex
functions is also convex [36, Subsection 3.2.3]. Finally, since Ck(xk) is a linear combination of
convex functions, Ck(xk) is convex in xk.
4.2 Uniqueness of Investments
Having established the convexity of the defender’s cost function (5), we now observe the difference
in the investment decisions made by behavioral and non-behavioral defenders. In particular, we
first show that the optimal investment decisions by a behavioral defender are unique, and then
contrast that with the (generally) non-unique optimal investments for non-behavioral defenders.
Proposition 1. Consider an attack graph G = (V, E) and a defender Dk. Assume the probability
of successful attack on each edge satisfies Assumption 1 and αk ∈ (0, 1) in the probability weighting
function (4). Then, the optimal investments by defender Dk to minimize (5) are unique.
Proof. Consider the defender’s optimization problem for the cost function in (5). Denote a path
(after investments) to be a “critical path” of an asset if it has the highest probability of successful
attack from the source to that asset (note that multiple paths can be critical). The “value” of a
path is its probability of successful attack (product of perceived probabilities on each edge in the
path).
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We claim that in any optimal solution x∗k, every edge that has a nonzero investment must
belong to some critical path. Let (va, vb) be an edge that does not belong to any critical path
7
and suppose by contradiction that x∗k is an optimal solution of (5) in which the edge (va, vb) has a
nonzero investment. Now, remove a sufficiently small nonzero investment ǫ from the edge (va, vb)
and spread it equally among all of the edges of the critical paths. This reduces the total attack
probability on the critical paths and thereby decreases the cost in (5), which yields a contradiction.
This shows that our claim is true.
Now, suppose that the defender’s cost function Ck(xk) does not have a unique minimizer. Then,
there exist two different minimizers x1k and x
2
k. Let E¯ ⊆ E be the set of edges where the investments
are different in the two solutions. For each asset vm ∈ Vk, let P¯m ⊆ Pm be the set of all paths
from the source to vm that pass through at least one edge in E¯. Define x
3
k =
1
2(x
1
k + x
2
k), which
must also be an optimal solution of Ck(xk) (by convexity of Ck(xk), as established in Lemma 2).
Furthermore, a component of x3k is nonzero whenever at least one of the corresponding components
in x1k or x
2
k is nonzero. In particular, x
3
k is nonzero on each edge in E¯.
For any investment vector xk, given a path P , we use xk,P to denote the vector of invest-
ments on edges on the path P . For each asset vm ∈ Vk and path P ∈ Pm, denote hP (xk,P ) ,∑
(vi,vj)∈P
(− log(pi,j(xi,j)))αk . By Lemma 1, each term of the form (− log(pi,j(xi,j)))αk is strictly
concave in xi,j when αk ∈ (0, 1). Thus, hP (xk,P ) is strictly concave in xk,P for αk ∈ (0, 1).
Then, using (4), the value of the path P is given by
fP (xk,P ) ,
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
wk(pi,j(xi,j)) = exp(−hP (xk,P )).
Note that by strict concavity of hP (xk,P ) in xk,P when αk ∈ (0, 1), fP (xk,P ) is strictly convex in
xk,P when αk ∈ (0, 1). For each asset vm ∈ Vk, the value of each critical path is
gm(xk) , max
P∈Pm
fP (xk,P )
= max
(
max
P∈P¯m
fP (xk,P ), max
P∈Pm\P¯m
fP (xk,P )
)
.
Now, returning to the optimal investment vector x3k, define
Mˆ , {vm ∈ Vk|max
P∈P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P ) ≥ max
P∈Pm\P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P )}.
In other words, Mˆ is the set of assets for which there is a critical path (under the investment vector
x3k) that passes through the set E¯ (where the optimal investments x
1
k and x
2
k differ). Now there are
7The proof holds even if there are multiple critical paths.
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two cases. The first case is when Mˆ is nonempty. We have (from (5))
Ck(x
3
k) =
∑
vm /∈Mˆ
Lm gm(x
3
k) +
∑
vm∈Mˆ
Lm gm(x
3
k)
(a)
=
∑
vm /∈Mˆ
Lm max
P∈Pm\P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P ) +
∑
vm∈Mˆ
Lm max
P∈P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P )
(b)
<
∑
vm /∈Mˆ
Lm
1
2
max
P∈Pm\P¯m
(fP (x
1
k,P ) + fP (x
2
k,P )) +
∑
vm∈Mˆ
Lm
1
2
max
P∈P¯m
(fP (x
1
k,P ) + fP (x
2
k,P ))
(c)
≤
∑
vm /∈Mˆ
Lm
1
2
max
P∈Pm
(fP (x
1
k,P ) + fP (x
2
k,P )) +
∑
vm∈Mˆ
Lm
1
2
max
P∈Pm
(fP (x
1
k,P ) + fP (x
2
k,P ))
(d)
≤ 1
2
∑
vm /∈Mˆ
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
fP (x
1
k,P ) + max
P∈Pm
fP (x
2
k,P )
)
+
1
2
∑
vm∈Mˆ
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
fP (x
1
k,P ) + max
P∈Pm
fP (x
2
k,P )
)
=
1
2

 ∑
vm∈Vk
Lm gm(x
1
k) +
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm gm(x
2
k)

 .
Note that (a) holds from the definition of Mˆ . Also, (b) holds since for each P ∈ P¯m, fP (x3k,P ) <
1
2(fP (x
1
k,P )+fP (x
2
k,P )) by strict convexity of fP in xk,P and since x
3
k,P is a strict convex combination
of x1k,P and x
2
k,P (by definition of P¯m). Thus, for vm ∈ Mˆ , max
P∈P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P ) < max
P∈P¯m
1
2(fP (x
1
k,P ) +
fP (x
2
k,P )). Further, (c) holds since the maximum over a subset of the paths (P¯m or Pm \ P¯m) is
less than or equal the maximum over the set of all paths Pm. Finally, (d) holds as the maximum
of a sum of elements is at most the sum of maxima. Thus, Ck(x
3
k) <
1
2(Ck(x
1
k) + Ck(x
2
k)) which
yields a contradiction to the optimality of x1k and x
2
k.
In the second case, suppose Mˆ is empty. Thus, ∀vm ∈ Vk, max
P∈P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P ) < max
P∈Pm\P¯m
fP (x
3
k,P ).
In other words, for all assets vm ∈ Vk, no critical paths go through the edge set E¯ (since P¯m
contains all such paths). However, x3k has nonzero investments on edges in E¯. Thus, x
3
k cannot
be an optimal solution (by the claim at the start of the proof). Thus, the second case is also
not possible. Hence there cannot be two different optimal solutions, and therefore the optimal
investments for the defender Dk are unique.
In contrast to the above result, the optimal investments by a non-behavioral defender (i.e.,
α = 1) need not be unique. To see this, consider an attack graph where the probability of successful
attack on each edge is given by the exponential function (6). As argued in equation (7), the
probability of successful attack on any given path is a function of the sum of the security investments
on all the edges in that path. Thus, given an optimal set of investments by a non-behavioral
defender, any other set of investments that maintains the same total investment on each path of
the graph is also optimal.
4.3 Locations of Optimal Investments for Behavioral and Non-Behavioral De-
fenders
We next study differences in the locations of the optimal investments by behavioral and non-
behavioral defenders. In particular, we first characterize the optimal investments by a non-
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Figure 3: An attack graph where a behavioral defender makes suboptimal investment decisions.
behavioral defender who is protecting a single asset, and subsequently compare that to the in-
vestments made by a behavioral defender. In the following result, we use the notion of a min-cut
in the graph. Specifically, given two nodes s and t in the graph, an edge-cut is a set of edges Ec ⊂ E
such that removing Ec from the graph also removes all paths from s to t. A min-cut is an edge-cut
of smallest cardinality over all possible edge-cuts [37].
Proposition 2. Consider an attack graph G = (V, E). Let the attack success probability under
security investments be given by pi,j(xi,j) = e
−xi,j , where xi,j ∈ R≥0 is the investment on edge
(vi, vj). Suppose there is a single target asset vt (i.e., all other assets have loss 0). Let Ec ⊆ E be
a min-cut between the source node vs and the target vt. Then, it is optimal for a non-behavioral
defender Dk to distribute all her investments equally only on the edge set Ec in order to minimize
(2).
Proof. Let N = |Ec| represent the number of edges in the min-cut set Ec. Let B be the defender’s
budget.
Consider any optimal investment of that budget. Recall from (7) that for probability functions
of the form (6), the probability of a successful attack of the target along a certain path P is a
decreasing function of the sum of the investments on the edges on that path. Using Menger’s
theorem [37], there are N edge-disjoint paths between vs and vt in G. At least one of those paths
has total investment at most BN . Therefore, the path with highest probability of attack from vs to
vt has total investment at most
B
N .
Now consider investing BN on each edge in the min-cut. Since every path from vs to vt goes
through at least one edge in Ec, every path has at least BN in total investment. Thus, it is optimal
to only invest on edges in Ec.
Finally, consider investing non-equally on edges in Ec where an edge (vi, vj) ∈ Ec has investment
xi,j <
B
N . Under this investment, since there are N edge-disjoint paths from vs to vt in G, there
exists a path P from vs to vt that has total investment less than
B
N . Thus, the path with the highest
probability of attack has a probability of attack larger than exp
(−BN ) (which would be obtained
when investing BN equally on each edge in Ec). Therefore, the true expected cost in (2) is higher
with this non-equal investment. Thus, the optimal investment on Ec must contain BN investment
on each edge in Ec.
Remark 4. The above result will continue to hold for more general probability functions pm,n(xm,n) =
p0m,ne
−xm,n with p0m,n 6= 1 if
∏
(vm,vn)∈P
p0m,n is the same for every path P ∈ Pt. The baseline success-
ful attack probability is then the same along every path to vt, and thus optimal investments can
be restricted to the edges in the min-cut set. 
The conclusion of Proposition 2 no longer holds when we consider the investments by a behav-
ioral defender (i.e., with αk < 1), as illustrated by the following example.
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Example 1. Consider the attack graph shown in Figure 3, with a single defender D (we will drop
the subscript k for ease of notation in this example) and a single target asset v5 with a loss of
L5 = 1 if successfully attacked. Let the defender’s budget be B, and let the probability of successful
attack on each edge (vi, vj) be given by pi,j(xi,j) = e
−xi,j , where xi,j is the investment on that edge.
This graph has two possible min-cuts, both of size 1: the edge (vs, v1), and the edge (v4, v5).
Thus, by Proposition 2, it is optimal for a non-behavioral defender to put all of her budget on
either one of these edges.
Now consider a behavioral defender with α < 1. With the above expression for pi,j(xi,j) and
using the Prelec function (4), we have w(pi,j(xi,j)) = e
−xαi,j . Thus, the perceived expected cost
function (5) is given by
C(x) = max
(
e−x
α
s,1−x
α
1,2−x
α
2,4−x
α
4,5 , e−x
α
s,1−x
α
1,3−x
α
3,4−x
α
4,5
)
,
corresponding to the two paths from the source vs to the target vt. One can verify (using the KKT
conditions) that the optimal investments are given by
x1,2 = x2,4 = x1,3 = x3,4 = 2
1
α−1xs,1 ,
x4,5 = xs,1 =
B − 4x1,2
2
=
B
2 + 4(2
1
α−1 )
.
(8)
Thus, for the true expected cost function (2), the optimal investments (corresponding to the non-
behavioral defender) yield a true expected cost of e−B, whereas the investments of the behavioral de-
fender yield a true expected cost of e−2
α
α−1
e
− B
1+2
α
α−1 , which is larger than that of the non-behavioral
defender.
The above example illustrates a key phenomenon: as the defender’s perception of probabilities
becomes increasingly skewed (captured by α becoming smaller), she shifts more of her investments
from the min-cut edges to the edges on the parallel paths between v1 and v4. This is in contrast to
the optimal investments (made by the non-behavioral defender) which lie entirely on the min-cut
edges. Indeed, by taking the limit as α ↑ 1, we have
xi,j = lim
α↑1
2
1
α−1 xs,1 = 2
−∞ xs,1 = 0
for edges (vi, vj) on the two parallel portions of the graph.
We now use this insight to identify graphs where the behavioral defender finds that investing
only on the min-cut edges is not optimal.
Proposition 3. Consider an attack graph G with a source vs and a target vt. Let Ec be a min-cut
between vs and vt, with size |Ec| = N . Suppose the graph contains another edge cut E ′c such that
E ′c ∩Ec = ∅ and |E
′
c| > |Ec|. Let the probability of successful attack on each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E be given
by pi,j(xi,j) = e
−xi,j , where xi,j is the investment on that edge. Let B be the budget of the defender.
Then, if 0 < αk < 1, investing solely on the min-cut set Ec is not optimal from the perspective of a
behavioral defender.
Proof. Denote M = |E ′c| > |Ec| = N . By Proposition 2, it is optimal to invest the entire budget
uniformly on edges in Ec in order to minimize the cost function (2). We will show that this
investment is not optimal with respect to the behavioral defender’s cost function (5); we will drop
the subscript k in αk for ease of notation.
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Starting with the optimal investments on the min edge cut Ec where each edge in Ec has nonzero
investment (as given by Proposition 2), remove a small investment ǫ from each of those N edges,
and add an investment of NǫM to each of the edges in E
′
c. We show that when ǫ is sufficiently small,
this will lead to a net reduction in perceived probability of successful attack on each path from vs
to vt.
Consider any arbitrary path P from vs to vt. Starting with the investments only on the minimum
edge cut Ec, the perceived probability of successful attack on path P will be
f1(x) , exp
(
−
∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
xαi,j
)
.
After removing ǫ investment from each of the N edges in Ec, and adding an investment of NǫM to
each of the edges in E ′c, the perceived probability on path P will be:
f2(x) , exp
(
−
∑
(vi,vj)∈E
′
c,
(vi,vj)∈P
(Nǫ
M
)α − ∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
(xi,j − ǫ)α
)
.
The net reduction in perceived probability on path P will be positive if f2(x) < f1(x), i.e.,
∑
(vi,vj)∈E
′
c,
(vi,vj)∈P
(
Nǫ
M
)α
+
∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
(xi,j − ǫ)α >
∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
xαi,j. (9)
If we define
f(ǫ) ,
∑
(vi,vj)∈E
′
c,
(vi,vj)∈P
(Nǫ
M
)α
+
∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
(xi,j − ǫ)α,
we see that inequality (9) is equivalent to showing that f(ǫ) > f(0). We have
df
dǫ
=
αN
M
∑
(vi,vj)∈E
′
c,
(vi,vj)∈P
(Nǫ
M
)α−1 − α ∑
(vi,vj)∈Ec,
(vi,vj)∈P
(xi,j − ǫ)α−1.
Note that limǫ↓0
df
dǫ =∞ which shows that f(ǫ) is increasing in ǫ for sufficiently small ǫ. Therefore,
f2(x) < f1(x) for sufficiently small ǫ. Since this analysis holds for every path from vs to vt, this
investment profile outperforms investing purely on the minimum edge cut.
Note that the graph in Figure 3 satisfies the conditions in the above result, with Ec = (v4, v5),
E ′c = {(v1, v2), (v1, v3)}.
Having established properties of the optimal investment decisions for behavioral and non-
behavioral defenders, we next turn our attention to the Behavioral Security Game with multiple
defenders, introduced in Section 3.
5 Analysis of Multi-Defender Games
5.1 Existence of a PNE
We first establish the existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PNE) for the class of be-
havioral games defined in Section 3. Recall that a profile of security investments by the defenders
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Figure 4: An instance of a Behavioral Security Game with multiple PNE. Defenders D1 and D2
are behavioral decision-makers with α1 = α2 = 0.5. The numbers above/left and below/right of
the edges represent investments by D1 and D2, respectively.
is said to be a PNE if no defender can decrease her cost by unilaterally changing her security
investment.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, the Behavioral Security Game possesses a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (PNE) when αk ∈ (0, 1] for each defender Dk.
Proof. The feasible defense strategy space Xk in (1) is nonempty, compact and convex for each
defenderDk. Furthermore, for all Dk ∈ D and investment vectors x−k, the cost function C(xk,x−k)
in (5) is convex in xk ∈ Xk; this follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that the investment xi,j on each
edge is a sum of the investments of all players on that edge. As a result, the Behavioral Security
Game is an instance of concave games, which always have a PNE [38].
Note that in contrast to the best responses by each player (which were unique when αk ∈ (0, 1),
as shown in Proposition 1), the PNE of Behavioral Security Games is not unique in general. We
illustrate this through the following example.
Example 2. Consider the attack graph of Figure 4. There are two defenders, D1 and D2, where
defender D1 wishes to protect node v4, and defender D2 wishes to protect node v5. Suppose that
D1 has a budget B1 = 16 and D2 has B2 = 12. Figs. 4a and 4b illustrate two distinct PNE for this
game. We obtained multiple Nash equilibria by varying the starting investment decision of defender
D1 and then following best response dynamics until the investments converged to an equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that these two Nash equilibria lead to different costs for the defenders.
First, for the Nash equilibrium of Figure 4a, defender D1’s perceived expected cost, given by (5),
is equal to exp(−4), while her true expected cost, given by (2), is equal to exp(−8). Defender D2
has a perceived expected cost of exp(−6), and a true expected cost of exp(−12). In contrast, for
the Nash equilibrium in Figure 4b, defender D1 has a perceived expected cost of exp
(−2√5) and
a true expected cost of exp(−10). Defender D2 has a perceived expected cost of exp(−5.78) and a
true expected cost of exp(−11.28).
As a result, the equilibrium in Figure 4a is preferred by defender D2, while the equilibrium in
Figure 4b has a lower expected cost (both perceived and real) for defender D1. Note also that the
total expected cost (i.e., sum of the true expected costs of defenders D1 and D2) is lower in the
equilibrium in Figure 4b; that is, the PNE of Figure 4b would be preferred from a social planner’s
perspective.
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Figure 5: An attack graph where PoBA is lower bounded by (1 − ǫ) exp(B) which shows that the
upper bound obtained in Proposition 5 is tight.
5.2 Measuring the Inefficiency of PNE: The Price of Behavioral Anarchy
The notion of Price of Anarchy (PoA) is often used to quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium
compared to the socially optimal outcome [39]. Specifically, the Price of Anarchy is defined as the
ratio of the highest total system true expected cost at a PNE to the total system true expected cost
at the social optimum. For our setting, we seek to define a measure to capture the inefficiencies
of the equilibrium due to both the defenders’ individual strategic behavior and their behavioral
decision-making. We thus define the Price of Behavioral Anarchy (PoBA) as the ratio of total
system true expected cost of behavioral defenders at the worst PNE (i.e., the PNE with the largest
total true expected cost over all PNE), to the total system true expected cost at the social optimum
(computed by a non-behavioral social planner).8
Specifically, we define Cˆ(x) ,
∑
Dk∈D
Cˆk(x), where Cˆk (defined in (2)) is the true expected cost
faced by defenderDk under the investment vector x. LetX
NE := {x¯ ∈ R|D||E|≥0 |x¯k ∈ argmin
x∈Xk
Ck(x, x¯−k),
∀Dk ∈ D}, i.e., XNE is the set of all investments that constitute a PNE. We now define the Price
of Behavioral Anarchy as
PoBA =
sup
x¯∈XNE Cˆ(x¯)
Cˆ(x∗)
, (10)
where x∗ denotes the investments at the social optimum (computed by a non-behavioral social
planner with access to the sum of all defenders’ budgets). Mathematically, let XSoc := {x∗ ∈
R
|D||E|
≥0 |1Tx∗ ≤
∑
∀Dk∈D
Bk}, i.e., XSoc is the set of all investments by the social planner and
x∗ ∈ argmin
x∗∈XSoc Cˆ(x
∗). When x¯ is any PNE, but not necessarily the one with the worst social
cost, we refer to the ratio of Cˆ(x¯) and Cˆ(x∗) as the “inefficiency” of the equilibrium. We emphasize
that the costs in both the numerator and the denominator are the sum of the true (rather than
perceived) expected costs of the defenders.
We will establish upper and lower bounds on the PoBA. We first show that the PoBA is bounded
if the total budget is bounded (regardless of the defenders’ behavioral levels).
Proposition 5. Let the sum of the budgets available to all defenders be B, and let the probability
of successful attack on each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E be given by pi,j(xi,j) = e−xi,j . Then, for any attack
graph and any profile of behavioral levels {αk}, PoBA ≤ exp(B).
Proof. We start with the numerator of the PoBA in (10) (the total true expected cost at the worst
PNE). Recall that each defender Dk incurs a loss Lm for each compromised asset vm. Thus, the
worst case true expected cost under any PNE (including the worst PNE) is upper bounded by∑
Dk∈D
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm (i.e., the sum of losses of all assets). On the other hand, the denominator (the
8One could also consider the impact of a behavioral social planner; since the goal of our paper is to quantify the
(objective) inefficiencies due to behavioral decision making, we leave the study of behavioral social planner for future
work.
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Figure 6: The numbers above (below) each edge represent investments by defender D1 (D2). In
(a), the non-behavioral defender D1 does not receive any investment contributions from the non-
behavioral defender D2. In (b), the non-behavioral defender D1 benefits from the investment
contributions of the behavioral defender D2.
socially optimal true expected cost) is lower bounded by

 ∑
Dk∈D
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm

 exp(−B) (which can
only be achieved if every asset has all of the budget B, invested by a social planner, on its attack
path). Substituting these bounds into (10), we obtain PoBA ≤ exp(B).
Next, we show that the upper bound on PoBA obtained in Proposition 5 is asymptotically tight.
Proposition 6. For all B > 0 and ǫ > 0, there exists an instance of the Behavioral Security Game
with total budget B such that the PoBA is lower bounded by (1− ǫ) exp(B).
Proof. Consider the attack graph in Figure 5, where the probability of successful attack on each
edge (vi, vj) is given by (6) with p
0
i,j = 1. This graph contains K defenders, and each defender Dk
is responsible for defending target node vk. Assume the total security budget B is divided equally
between the K defenders (i.e., each defender has security budget BK ). Let the first node have loss
equal to L1 = K, and the other K − 1 nodes have loss 1K−1 . Then, the socially optimal solution
would put all the budget B on the first link (vs, v1), so that all nodes have probability of successful
attack given by exp(−B). Thus, the denominator of (10) is ∑Ki=1 Li exp(−B) = (K + 1) exp(−B).
We now characterize a lower bound on the cost under a PNE (i.e., the numerator of (10)).
Specifically, consider the investment profile where each defender Dk puts their entire budget
B
K on
the edge coming into their node vk. We claim that this is a PNE. To show this, first consider defender
D1. Since investments on edges other than (vs, v1) do not affect the probability of successful attack
at node v1, it is optimal for defender D1 to put all her investment on (vs, v1).
Now consider defender D2. Given D1’s investment on (vs, v1), defender D2 has to decide how
to optimally spread her budget of BK over the two edges (vs, v1) and (v1, v2) in order to minimize
her cost function (5). Thus, D2’s optimization problem, given D1’s investment, is
minimize
x2s,1+x
2
1,2=
B
K
e−(
B
K
+x2s,1)
α2−(x21,2)
α2
. (11)
The unique optimal solution of (11) (for all α2 ∈ (0, 1)) would be to put all BK into x21,2 and zero
on x2s,1. This is also optimal (but not unique) when α2 = 1.
Continuing this analysis, we see that if defenders D1,D2, . . . ,Dk−1 have each invested
B
K on the
edges incoming into their nodes, it is optimal for defender Dk to also invest their entire budget
B
K
on the incoming edge to vk. Thus, investing
B
K on each edge is a PNE.
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The numerator of the PoBA under this PNE is lower bounded by L1 exp
(−BK ) = K exp(−BK ).
Thus, the PoBA is lower bounded by
PoBA ≥ K exp
(−BK )
(K + 1) exp(−B) =
K exp
(−BK )
(K + 1)
exp(B).
As the length of the chain grows, we have lim
K→∞
K exp
(−BK )
(K + 1)
= 1. Thus, for every ǫ > 0, there
exists K large enough such that the PoBA in the line graph with K nodes is lower bounded by
(1− ǫ) exp(B).
Remark 5. The upper bound obtained in Proposition 5 is agnostic to the structure of the network,
the number of defenders, and their degree of misperception of probabilities. In Proposition 6, our
result shows that the upper bound obtained in Proposition 5 is sharp (i.e., it cannot be reduced
without additional assumptions on the game). For any particular instance of the problem, however,
we can compute the inefficiency directly, which will depend on the network structure and other
parameters of that instance. 
Before considering the case study, we will conclude this section with an example of an inter-
esting phenomenon, where the (objectively) suboptimal investment decisions made by a behavioral
defender with respect to their own assets can actually benefit the other defenders in the network.
Example 3. We consider the attack graph of Figures 6a and 6b with two defenders, D1 and D2.
Defender D1 wishes to protect node v3, and defender D2 wishes to protect node v4. Note that
D1’s asset (v3) is directly on the attack path to D2’s asset (v4). Suppose that defender D1 has a
budget B1 = 5, while defender D2 has a budget B2 = 20. The optimal investments in the following
scenarios were calculated using CVX [40].
Suppose both defenders are non-behavioral. In this case, Proposition 2 suggests that it is optimal
for D2 to put her entire budget on the min-cut, given by the edge (v3, v4). The corresponding PNE
is shown in Figure 6a. On the other hand, as indicated by Proposition 3, investing solely on the
min-cut is no longer optimal for a behavioral defender. Indeed, Figure 6b shows a PNE for the case
where D2 is behavioral with α2 = 0.6, and has spread some of her investment to the other edges in
the attack graph. Therefore, D1’s subnetwork will benefit due to the behavioral decision-making by
D2.
It is also worth considering the total system true expected cost of the game at equilibrium, given
by Cˆ(x¯) = Cˆ1(x¯) + Cˆ2(x¯) where x¯ is the investment at the PNE. For this example, when both
defenders are non-behavioral (i.e., α1 = α2 = 1), Cˆ(x¯) = 16.42, while Cˆ(x¯) = 1.13 if defender
D2 is behavioral (with α1 = 1, α2 = 0.6). This considerable drop in the total true expected cost
shows that the behavioral defender’s contributions to the non-behavioral defender’s subnetwork may
also be beneficial to the overall welfare of the network, especially under budget asymmetries or if
defender D1’s asset is more valuable.
6 Case Study
Here, we examine the outcomes of behavioral decision-making in a case study involving a distributed
energy resource failure scenario, DER.1, identified by the US National Electric Sector Cybersecurity
Organization Resource (NESCOR) [28]. Figure 7 is replicated from the attack graph for the DER.1
(Figure 4 in [28]). Suppose the probability of successful attack on each edge is pi,j(xi,j) = e
−xi,j .
There are two defenders, D1 and D2. Defender D1’s critical assets are G0 and G, with losses of
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Figure 7: Attack graph of a DER.1 failure scenario adapted from [28]. It shows stepping-stone
attack steps that can lead to the compromise of a photovoltaic generator (PV) (i.e., G0) or an
electric vehicle charging station (EV) (i.e., G1).
L0 = 200 and L = 100, respectively. Defender D2’s critical assets are G1 and G, also with losses of
L1 = 200 and L = 100, respectively. Note that G is a shared asset among the two defenders.
We assume that each defender has a security budget of B2 (i.e., the budget distribution is
symmetric between the two defenders). For a fair comparison, the social planner has total budget
B. In our experiments, we use best response dynamics to find a Nash equilibrium x¯. We then
compute the socially optimal investment x∗, and calculate the ratio given by (10) to measure the
inefficiency of the corresponding equilibrium.
Figure 8 shows the value of this ratio as we sweep α (taken to be the same for both defenders)
from 0 (most behavioral) to 1 (non-behavioral), for different values of the total budget B. As the
figure shows, the inefficiency of the equilibrium decreases to 1 as α increases, reflecting the fact
that the investment decisions become better as the defenders become less behavioral; see Section
4. Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the inefficiency due to behavioral decision-making becomes
exacerbated as the total budget B increases. This happens as behavioral defenders shift higher
amounts of their budget to the parallel edges in the networks (i.e., not in the min-cut edge set), as
suggested by Proposition 3. On the other hand, the social planner can significantly lower the total
cost when the budget increases, as she puts all the budget only on the min-cut edges, as suggested
by Proposition 2; this reduces the total cost faster towards zero as the budget increases.
Other practical scenarios (such as deploying moving-target defense) where our results are appli-
cable can be found in the book chapter [13]. While our results show that the inefficiency becomes
exacerbated as the total budget increases, this property does not hold for all networks. We omit
further discussions about these aspects due to space constraints.
7 Summary of Findings
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the impacts of behavioral decision-making on the se-
curity of interdependent systems. First, we showed that the optimal investments by a behavioral
decision-maker will be unique, whereas non-behavioral decision-makers may have multiple optimal
9Recall that the inefficiency is the ratio of the total system true expected cost at a PNE to the total system true
expected cost at the (non-behavioral) social optimum.
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Figure 8: The inefficiency for different behavioral levels of the defenders. We observe that the inef-
ficiency increases as the security budget increases, and as the defenders become more behavioral.9
solutions. Second, non-behavioral decision-makers find it optimal to concentrate their security in-
vestments on minimum edge-cuts in the network in order to protect their assets, whereas behavioral
decision-makers will choose to spread their investments over other edges in the network, potentially
making their assets more vulnerable. Third, we showed that multi-defender games possess a PNE
(under appropriate conditions on the game), and introduced a metric that we termed the “Price of
Behavioral Anarchy” to quantify the inefficiency of the PNE as compared to the security outcomes
under socially optimal investments. We provided a tight bound on PoBA, which depended only
on the total budget across all defenders. However, we also showed that the tendency of behavioral
defenders to spread their investments over the edges of the network can potentially benefit the
other defenders in the network. Finally, we presented a case study where the inefficiency of the
equilibrium increased as the defenders became more behavioral.
In total, our analysis shows that human decision-making (as captured by behavioral probability
weighting) can have substantial impacts on the security of interdependent systems, and must be
accounted for when designing and operating distributed, interdependent systems. In other words,
the insights that are provided by our work (e.g., that behavioral decision-makers may move some
of their security investments away from critical portions of the network) can be used by system
planners to identify portions of their network that may be left vulnerable by the human security
personnel who are responsible for managing those parts of the network. A future avenue for research
is to perform human experiments to test our predictions. Moreover, studying the properties of secu-
rity investments when different edges have different degrees of misperception of attack probabilities
is another avenue for future research.
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